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DYNAMIC RESOLUTION OF LARGE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
THOMAS H. JACKSON & DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.*
One of the more important issues emerging out of the 2008 financial crisis
concerns the proper resolution of a systemically important financial institution.
In response to this, Title II of Dodd-Frank created the Orderly Liquidation Au-
thority, or OLA, which is designed to create a resolution framework for systemi-
cally important financial institutions that is based on the resolution authority
that the FDIC has held over commercial bank failures. In this Article, we con-
sider the various alternatives for resolving systemically important institutions.
Among these alternatives, we discuss OLA, a European-style bail-in process,
and coerced mergers, while also extensively focusing on the bankruptcy code.
We argue that implementing several discrete modifications to Dodd-Frank, as
well adopting an ambitious Chapter 14 proposal written by a working group at
the Hoover Institution is the best way forward for establishing a strong resolu-
tion framework.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 R
I. DODD-FRANK’S RESOLUTION RULES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 R
A. The Basic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439 R
B. The Rhetorical Context and its Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . 440 R
C. Key Problems with the Dodd-Frank Resolution Rules . . . 442 R
D. Potential Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 R
II. THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446 R
A. The Bankruptcy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446 R
B. Benefits of Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 R
C. The Limitations of Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 R
D. The Role and Status of Bankruptcy Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 R
III. IS BAIL-IN THE SOLUTION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 R
IV. REGULATOR-BROKERED SALES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 R
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL REFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 R
A. Next Steps for Dodd-Frank and Bankruptcy Reform . . . . . 457 R
B. A More Ambitious Program: Chapter 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460 R
* University Professor, University of Rochester, and S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corpo-
rate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, respectively.  We are grateful to Hideki
Kanda, Joseph Sommer, James Thompson and participants at the Chicago Federal Reserve
Conference on The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability for helpful comments, and to
the editors of the Harvard Business Law Review for their collaboration throughout the writing
and editing process.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\2-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 2  1-FEB-13 8:11
436 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2
INTRODUCTION
As of 2008, when the financial crisis hit in earnest, there were two
principal options if a large financial institution fell into distress in the United
States: bankruptcy or some kind of government bailout. Specialized admin-
istrative resolution rules governed particular kinds of subsidiaries—commer-
cial banks were and are subject to resolution by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC),1 for instance, and state regulators handle in-
surance company failures2—but bankruptcy or bailout was the choice for
bank holding companies and nonbank financial institutions. After the initial
wave of the crisis passed, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Trea-
sury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and other key regulators called on Con-
gress to put an administrative resolution framework in place for these
institutions as well.3 In 2010, with the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), they got
their wish.4 Title II of the legislation (the Orderly Liquidation Authority, or
OLA) gives regulators the power to take over and resolve financial institu-
tions whose failure could cause systemic problems.5
The Dodd-Frank resolution rules were controversial before they were
enacted and that controversy has continued. In response to some of this con-
troversy, the FDIC claimed that it might have secured a recovery of ninety-
seven cents on the dollar if it had had its current resolution powers in the
months before Lehman Brothers collapsed.6 Critics scoff at these claims and
characterize the new administrative resolution framework, despite ominous-
sounding statutory language, as having perpetuated bailouts.7 Many of the
critics argue for some version of the existing bankruptcy laws as the best
strategy for resolving the financial distress of the largest financial institu-
1 See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (2006).
2 See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).
3 Oversight of the Federal Government’s Intervention at American International Group:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 111th Cong. 111-20 (2009) (statement of Ben
S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20090324a.htm; Systemic Regulation, Prudential Matters, Res-
olution Authority and Securitization, 111th Cong. 111-88 (2009) (statement of Timothy F.
Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Treasury), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
Calendar/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=231801.
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
5 Id. §§ 201–217.
6 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. 31 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ana-
lytical/quarterly/2011_vol52.html [hereinafter Lehman Report].
7 See, e.g., Kenneth Scott, A Guide to the Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions:
Dodd-Frank Title II and Proposed Chapter 14, 15 (February 29, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018035 (arguing that
Title II precludes bailouts of shareholders but permits creditor bailouts); VERN MCKINLEY,
FINANCING FAILURE: A CENTURY OF BAILOUTS 283 (2011) (“Although the goal of ending
taxpayer bailouts once and for all is a noble objective, the likelihood that the Dodd-Frank
legislation has accomplished this is quite small.”).
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tions.8 Unlike the new resolution rules (and the FDIC bank resolution pow-
ers on which they are based), which vest regulators with the authority to
determine how much creditors are paid and how the financial distress is
resolved,9 bankruptcy leaves much of the decision making to the parties
themselves, subject to statutory rules and judicial oversight. Under the cor-
porate reorganization provisions of Chapter 11, a corporation’s managers
generally decide when to commence the process,10 and either propose a sale
of the firm’s assets or negotiate the terms of a reorganization with its credi-
tors.11 In a traditional reorganization, the negotiations culminate in a vote by
each class of creditors and shareholders whether to approve the proposed
plan.12
In Europe, lawmakers are considering a third strategy for resolving the
financial distress of a large financial institution, an approach generally
known as bail-in.13 Like OLA, bail-in is a form of administrative resolution,
but it is designed to serve as a mid-course correction to preserve a troubled
financial institution rather than as a full-blown, administrative resolution.
The most prominent proposals assume that regulators will determine when to
intervene, and would dictate which claims could be altered and which could
not.14 Under some models of bail-in, adjustments to creditors’ entitlements
would occur automatically, based on a market trigger.15
One important objective of this Article is to carefully assess the
strengths and weaknesses of each of the principal options. In addition to
OLA, bankruptcy, and bail-in, we also consider a more idiosyncratic, but
undeniably important, resolution option: coerced, nonresolution sales. Co-
erced sales were a major feature of the 2008 crisis—Bear Stearns and Wa-
8 See Scott, supra note 7, at 15–17 (favorably comparing bankruptcy, as amended by a R
Chapter 14 proposal advocated by a Hoover Institution working group, to OLA).
9 See Dodd-Frank Act § 204.
10 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (A “voluntary case . . . is commenced by the filing . . . of a
petition . . . by an entity that may be a debtor . . . .”). While, under certain circumstances,
creditors can file an “involuntary petition,” see 11 U.S.C. § 303, this is unusual for large
institutions.
11 Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107 and 1108, the managers of the company, as “debtor in pos-
session,” 11 U.S.C. § 1101(a), are authorized to continue running the business. They are the
only ones who are permitted to propose a reorganization plan for at least the first four months
of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b). Both of these provisions can be changed by judicial decision.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108.
12 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (requirement that every class approve plan as prereq-
uisite to confirming a consensual reorganization plan). The Chapter 11 process is described
infra Part II.
13 Riva Froymovich, EU Barnier: Bail-Ins Must Be Option Included in Bank Resolutions,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120330-703493.html.
14 See, e.g., Thomas F. Huertas, Vice Chairman, Comm. of European Banking Supervisors
and Dir., Banking Sector, U.K. Fin. Services Auth., The Road to Better Resolution: From Bail-
out to Bail-in, Speech at The Euro and the Financial Crisis Conference hosted by the Bank of
Slovenia (Sept. 6, 2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/
2010/0906_th.shtml; CLIFFORD CHANCE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK BAIL-INS 6 (2011).
15 CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 14, at 6. R
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chovia were both resolved through brokered sales.16 Even if the Dodd-Frank
Act has eliminated the possibility of traditional bailouts—an issue that is
subject to considerable debate—regulators still may still be in a position to
midwife sales outside of the formal resolution process. Indeed, the very pro-
visions that are designed to discourage bailouts, such as a requirement that
any Federal Reserve financial intervention occur on an industry-wide basis,17
rather than with particular firms, could facilitate the coerced merger strategy.
The second major objective of this Article is to provide a dynamic ac-
count of the existing options. The resolution options are not mutually exclu-
sive. For instance, a large financial institution can be resolved either in
bankruptcy or under the Dodd-Frank resolution rules. Although the principal
bail-in proposals look very different than the Dodd-Frank resolution frame-
work, a resolution that looks quite similar to bail-in could theoretically be
achieved under Dodd-Frank. By considering how these various moving parts
fit together, we can better see how the different approaches work.
Our final objective is more explicitly normative. Based on our analysis
of the principal resolution options and the relationships among them, we
offer both simple and more elaborate proposals for enhancing and better
integrating the resolution architecture.
We should acknowledge from the outset that we are not disinterested
observers. In our own writings in this area, we have strongly defended bank-
ruptcy as an alternative to either the bailouts of 2008 or to the new Dodd-
Frank resolution rules.18 We continue to defend bankruptcy in this Article,
but we nevertheless try to provide a comparatively even-handed assessment
of its limitations, as well as the strengths of the alternative approaches.
In Parts I and II of the Article, we describe and assess the new Dodd-
Frank resolution rules and provide an analogous assessment of bankruptcy.
In a small concession to our own views, our discussion of Dodd-Frank reso-
lution begins with its problems, whereas we start with the virtues when we
turn to bankruptcy. In Part III, we consider the bail-in proposals that have
figured particularly prominently in European discussions. The benefits and
shortcomings of bail-ins parallel those of the Dodd-Frank framework in
many respects, but there are also key differences. In Part IV, we consider the
future of coerced mergers. The issue of coerced mergers requires us to ex-
amine the Dodd-Frank provisions that are designed to prevent bailouts, and
16 David Zaring, The Post-Crisis and Its Critics, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1169, 1180 (2010).
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1101(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–2116 (2010).
18 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Chapter 11F: A Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to
Resolve (Restructure, Sell, or Liquidate) Financial Institutions, in ENDING GOVERNMENT
BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM (Kenneth Scott et al., eds., 2009); David A Skeel, Jr., Give
Bankruptcy a Chance, WKLY. STANDARD, June 29, 2009, available at http://www.weeklystan-
dard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/658hmvhc.asp; Thomas H. Jackson & David A.
Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Reform Will Limit Bailouts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2010), http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704671904575194010886218980.html.
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leads to the question of the extent to which regulators with resolution author-
ity can realistically be constrained by legal rules during a crisis.
In Part V, we shift to an explicitly normative mode. Having probed the
existing options and the interactions among them, we advocate two sets of
reforms. The first is a simple package of adjustments that would include a
stay on derivatives in bankruptcy, as well as several amendments to Dodd-
Frank. The second is a proposal for a new Chapter 14 that was drafted by a
working group of the Hoover Institution.19 The goal, we argue, should be to
make bankruptcy the option of choice, with administrative resolution neces-
sary only in rare cases.
I. DODD-FRANK’S NEW RESOLUTION RULES
The Dodd-Frank resolution rules are designed to extend the powers that
regulators previously had when a commercial bank failed to also apply to
systemically important financial institutions of all kinds. Prior to 2010, bank
regulators’ resolution authority was limited to commercial banking subsidiar-
ies.20 If a banking conglomerate fell into financial distress, its holding com-
pany and any nonbank subsidiaries were subject to the ordinary bankruptcy
process.21 Under the new resolution rules, bank regulators now have author-
ity over the entire holding company network.22
In the discussion that follows, we begin by briefly describing the Dodd-
Frank resolution rules. We then point out several misconceptions that lie at
the heart of the framework, before turning to a more careful consideration of
the strengths and weaknesses of administrative resolution of the largest fi-
nancial institutions.
A. The Basic Framework
Resolution under Dodd-Frank begins when “the three keys turn”—
Treasury proposes to take over a systemically important financial company
that is in or near default, and the Fed and FDIC concur by a two-thirds
19 Thomas H. Jackson et al., Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions: Orderly Liquida-
tion Authority and a New Chapter 14 (April 25, 2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/
sites/default/files/documents/Resolution-Project-Booklet-4-11.pdf (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter Chapter 14 Proposal].
20 The Treasury Department White Paper that served as the original foundation for the
legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Act heavily emphasized the limitations on regulators’
reach. According to the report, “[t]he federal government’s responses to the impending bank-
ruptcy of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG were complicated by the lack of a statutory
framework for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank financial firms, including affiliates
of banks or other insured depository institutions.” U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL RE-
FORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 76 (June 2009) [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER].
21 See id.
22 See Dodd-Frank Act § 201(a)(11) (definition of “financial company”), § 202 (com-
mencement of orderly liquidation for a covered financial company).
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vote.23 If the company does not agree to the intervention, resolution is com-
menced by the filing of a petition in the federal district court in Washington,
DC.24 The court has twenty-four hours to consider the petition.25 Unless the
court invalidates the petition as “arbitrary and capricious,” the FDIC takes
over the company as its receiver, and the managers are kicked out.26 The
FDIC has nearly unfettered discretion to sell the company or any of its parts,
either directly or after transferring the assets to a bridge financial company.27
The resolution rules include a variety of provisions that are designed to
counter complaints that the new framework would institutionalize bailouts.
One provision explicitly requires that the financial institution’s managers be
removed if they were responsible for the financial distress, shareholders be
wiped out, and creditors take losses.28 The framework also instructs regula-
tors to liquidate the institution rather than reorganize it.29 Although these
provisions sound like harsh medicine, the FDIC also is also given ample
discretion to sidestep them, as we shall see.
B. The Rhetorical Context and its Implications
The rhetorical justification for the new resolution rules was a mislead-
ing analogy promoted by bank regulators during the financial reform debates
of 2009 and 2010. According to the Treasury and FDIC, the FDIC had been
highly effective in handling the failures of ordinary commercial banks, but
these powers did not extend to bank holding companies or nonbank financial
institutions.30 The obvious response to the 2008 crisis, they successfully ar-
gued, would be to expand the government’s powers, modeled on those held
by the FDIC, to include systemically important financial institutions.31
Regulators did encounter serious headwinds in one respect. Although
their original blueprint for reform would have given regulators broad rescue
powers, popular opinion was extremely hostile to bailouts.32 In the face of
repeated criticism, Dodd-Frank’s drafters added a variety of provisions that
are designed to make resolution look less like a bailout. Whereas regulators
can use a liquidation-like receivership process or a more reorganization-ori-
ented conservatorship process for ordinary banks, Dodd-Frank limits them to
the receivership option for covered financial companies.33 The resolution
23 See id. § 203.
24 See id. § 202.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 See id. § 210.
28 Id. § 206.
29 See id. § 208.
30 See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 76. R
31 See id.
32 See Poll: Frustration Growing Over Bailouts, CBS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2009, 10:00 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500160_162-4870196.html.
33 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 137 (2010).
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rules also instruct regulators to oust any managers that are responsible for
the institution’s failure, and to ensure that shareholders and creditors take
losses. The coup de grâce is a provision that was proposed by Senator Bar-
bara Boxer late in the legislative process, which explicitly states that rehabil-
itation is not permitted; if regulators take over a troubled financial
institution, they must liquidate it.34
If systemically important financial institutions were indeed like the
small and medium sized banks that the FDIC ordinarily handles, these
marching orders (at least apart from the liquidation “mandate”) would be
less problematic. But there are vast differences. With ordinary banks, the
FDIC negotiates with one or more healthy banks, and arranges for one to
acquire either the troubled bank’s deposits or the deposits together with some
or all of the troubled bank’s assets and other liabilities.35 Regulators ideally
descend on the troubled bank on a Friday afternoon, and then effect the
transfer over the weekend so that the transfer will be complete before the
start of business on Monday.36 This strategy generally will not work with a
systemically important financial institution. There often will be very few
logical buyers, and the resolution cannot realistically be achieved over a
weekend. If these large institutions truly were liquidated, the results would
be disastrous.
Fortunately, if there ever were a resolution, it is unlikely that regulators
would take the command to liquidate seriously. The FDIC’s powers in Dodd
Frank resolution can easily be turned to more flexible ends. The FDIC can
set up a bridge financial company, for instance, and transfer some or all of
the bank’s assets and liabilities to it.37 The bridge financial company could
easily serve as the platform for a restructuring. The FDIC itself has increas-
ingly trumpeted its bridge financial company powers as a signal advantage
of OLA as compared to other resolution options. In its report on Lehman, the
FDIC wrote, “The Dodd-Frank Act provides an efficient mechanism—the
bridge financial company—to quickly preserve the going-concern value of
the firm’s assets and business lines. There are no specific parallel provisions
in the Bankruptcy Code.”38
As this rather blatant trumpeting of the ability to preserve going-con-
cern value indicates, Dodd-Frank’s liquidation-only rule is unlikely to func-
tion the way lawmakers perhaps envisioned. As a result, the rule will have
two serious costs. First, it will inject uncertainty into the resolution process.
The FDIC’s use of a bridge financial institution may be challenged as violat-
34 Dodd-Frank Act § 214.
35 FDIC resolution of distressed commercial banks is described in SKEEL, supra note 33, R
at 125–26. Moreover, because of the prevalence of government-guaranteed deposits, in most
cases the FDIC is the logical “residual owner” of an insolvent bank, with appropriate financial
incentives.
36 CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 14, at 6. R
37 See Dodd-Frank Act § 210(h).
38 Lehman Report, supra note 6, at 36–37. R
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ing the “thou shalt liquidate” requirement. The second cost is moral and
cultural. Many Americans were cynical about claims that the financial re-
forms would genuinely curb bailouts. Insisting that large financial institu-
tions will not be bailed out when regulators know they will be could
exacerbate the cynicism.39
C. Key Problems with the Dodd-Frank Resolution Rules
The key shortcomings of administrative resolution are well known and
are handled with varying degrees of effectiveness by the new resolution
rules. In the discussion that follows, we focus on four of the most important
shortcomings.
The first difficulty is initiation. Because regulators do not have a finan-
cial stake in the institutions they oversee, they do not have an incentive to
initiate insolvency proceedings in a timely fashion.40 Their personal interests
are more likely to be served by erring on the side of delay, rather than
through prompt intervention. After the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis of the
1980s, Congress addressed this concern in commercial bank resolution by
enacting prompt corrective action rules that require regulators to intervene as
a bank’s financial condition deteriorates.41 Dodd-Frank, by contrast, gives
regulators complete discretion whether and when to intervene.42 It focuses
more on assuring that an intervention is difficult to challenge once regulators
decide to take a large institution over. Dodd-Frank’s principal strategy for
forcing regulators’ hand is to make bailouts more difficult outside of resolu-
tion by limiting the Fed’s 13(3) powers. Under the new framework, the Fed
is prohibited from using its emergency lending powers to support an individ-
ual financial institution; any intervention must be pursuant to a “program or
facility with broad-based eligibility.”43 The new restrictions are unlikely to
thwart bailouts altogether, however. The Fed could sidestep the restriction
by creating an ostensibly broad-based program that actually is aimed at one
or a small group of institutions, which suggests that delayed initiation will
continue to be the norm.
The second problem is that administrative resolution is nontransparent
and violates rule of law principles, including basic priority rules. In ordinary
bank resolution, for instance, the FDIC has almost complete discretion over
which assets and liabilities to transfer to a purchaser and which to leave
39 For further discussion, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Making Sense of the New Financial
Deal, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 181 (2011).
40 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Kaye, Scholer, Firrea, and the
Desirability of Early Closure: A View of the Kaye, Scholer Case From the Perspective of Bank
Regulatory Policy, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1115, 1133 (1993).
41 See, e.g., id. at 1134.
42 See SKEEL, supra note 33, at 131. R
43 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1101(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–2116 (2010).
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behind.44 In theory, creditors can challenge the FDIC’s determination,45 but
judicial review is severely limited in practice. With most commercial banks,
the consequences are not severe, because the vast majority of the bank’s
liabilities are insured deposits. Nearly 93% of the liabilities of banks with
between $100 million and $500 million in assets are deposits.46 In essence,
for these banks, the FDIC is not just the decision-maker, but also the major
creditor.47 Systemically important financial institutions, by contrast, have a
far greater range of liabilities, and a much smaller role for government-guar-
antees (and hence for the symmetry between the decision-maker and the
residual owner). Regulatory discretion is therefore a much more serious
concern.
The resolution rules try to address this concern in three ways. First,
regulators are not permitted to pick and choose which derivatives and other
qualifying financial contracts with a particular party to keep and which to
terminate.48 They must either assume all of the contracts (which ordinarily
will mean transferring them to a bridge bank) with a particular counterparty,
or terminate all of them.49 Second, regulators are required to give each credi-
tor at least as much as the creditor would have received if the financial insti-
tution had been liquidated and its proceeds distributed in accordance with
the absolute priority rule.50 Finally, if creditors receive more than this
amount, regulators are instructed to claw back the excess except for “pay-
ments or amounts necessary to initiate and continue operations essential to
implementation of the receivership or any bridge financial company.”51
Because regulators have only one day to make their decision,52 they will
likely assume all of the institution’s derivatives. They can preempt other
creditors’ complaints about this favored treatment by giving them a small
recovery and arguing that the creditors would have received little or nothing
in a true liquidation. Because of the absence of a proceeding, or readily
available information, challenging the FDIC’s moment-in-time liquidation
valuation after-the-fact may be practically impossible. The clawback provi-
sion theoretically could offset the effect of this differential treatment to some
extent, by requiring derivatives creditors to give back the portion of their
recovery that exceeds liquidation value.  But the FDIC can (and one sus-
pects, would) sidestep the clawback by characterizing protection of the insti-
tution’s derivatives as essential to the operations of the bridge financial
company.
44 See SKEEL, supra note 33, at 147. R
45 See id. at 131.
46 See id. at 123.
47 A 1993 law enshrines a priority for depositors behind secured claims and administrative
expenses only. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A) (2006).
48 See Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(11).
49 Id. § 210(c)(11). This may be the consequence of most master agreements anyway.
50 Id. §§ 210(a)(7)(B), 210(d)(2).
51 Id. § 210(o)(1)(D)(i).
52 Id. § 203(c)(2).
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The FDIC already has suggested that it will indeed protect short-term
creditors rather than expose them to losses.53 The cost of this protection will
be continued creditor moral hazard, in that the creditors with the best oppor-
tunity to discover—and act upon—an institution’s growing financial diffi-
culties will have little, if any incentive, to act. The failure to adequately
address creditor moral hazard is the third problem with Dodd-Frank
resolution.
The fourth problem is expertise. With ordinary banks, the FDIC has
both the experience and expertise necessary to handle bank failures reasona-
bly well. If our predictions about Dodd-Frank resolution are even close to
correct, the FDIC would essentially be running a systemically important fi-
nancial institution for at least a year or two if the resolution rules were in-
voked.54 The FDIC does not have the staff or expertise necessary to run a
major financial institution. Since the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the FDIC
has been scrambling to scale up its capacity, but it is nowhere near well
positioned to manage a financial institution like Citigroup or Bank of
America. Questions about the FDIC’s competence could undermine its abil-
ity to preserve confidence in the bridge financial institution during the transi-
tion period.
To be sure, several factors may mitigate the expertise deficit to some
extent. The first is that the FDIC does not need to have all of the relevant
experts in house. Much as restructuring experts are brought on to help in
ordinary corporate bankruptcies, the FDIC could hire managers to run a fi-
nancial institution in resolution.55 In addition, if the living wills that are now
required by Dodd-Frank are implemented effectively, regulators will not be
starting from scratch at the outset of the resolution process. Nevertheless, the
FDIC’s expertise deficit raises very serious questions about its ability to han-
dle the failure of a systemically important financial institution. The deficit is
exacerbated by the fact that the FDIC is not a systemically important institu-
tion’s primary regulator; in the absence of financial distress, the Federal Re-
serve plays that role. Even if the FDIC succeeds in closing some of the
expertise deficit in the near term, it is far from clear that it can retain the
highly-qualified experts it needs over the long haul, particularly if there is
little for them to do between crises—which we hope will be the norm! The
FDIC is likely to be better prepared now than it will be if resolution is first
invoked five years from now, or ten.
53 See The Ruling Ad-Hocracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at A12.
54 Recall that one of the consequences of administrative resolution under Title II of Dodd-
Frank is the likely termination of management of the financial institution, giving real punch to
the notion of the FDIC “running” the institution.
55 How easily a complete team of such managers—with relevant experience—could be
assembled remains to be seen; we tend to believe it may be a serious practical problem given
that there will be little, if any time, for a new management team to come “up to speed.”
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D. Potential Benefits
As we turn from the problems with Dodd-Frank resolution to its poten-
tial benefits, we are reminded of Barack Obama’s grudging allowance, dur-
ing a 2008 debate, that Hillary Clinton was “likeable enough.”56 Although
we are not a great deal more enthusiastic about Dodd-Frank resolution than
Obama was about his then-opponent, it does offer several possible benefits.
The first benefit is that the resolution rules give the FDIC the capacity
to intervene quickly and with ample funding to support ongoing business
operations. This is of course the flipside of the propensity for regulators to
bail out troubled institutions. The FDIC is authorized to borrow up to 10% of
the book value of the institution as of the time it is taken over, and 90% of
its value in resolution.57 For the largest of banks, this would make over $200
billion available as of the time of the take-over, and far more under an ag-
gressive interpretation of the 90% standard the moment the resolution was
underway.58 A bridge financial company might even have access to the Fed-
eral Reserve’s discount window. Although the discount window is only
available to solvent financial institutions, nothing bars a bridge financial in-
stitution from qualifying so long as enough liabilities are left behind to leave
it solvent.59 Given these financing options, the FDIC should be fully capable
of keeping any essential functions operating and paying any counterparties
as needed.
A second benefit is the possibility of regulatory coordination. The
Dodd-Frank Act itself does not contribute a great deal to the international
dimensions of a default of a systemically important financial institution. Its
major innovation in this regard is the new requirement that systemically im-
portant financial institutions prepare a rapid resolution plan—or “living
will.”60 As a result, any coordination on an international level will have to
take place on an ad hoc basis. To some extent, regulators already interact
through international conferences and periodic meetings. Although this is
not a robust solution to the international problems that attended the Lehman
default, it may be that networks of regulators will be better able to coordi-
nate an international proceeding than bankruptcy judges are. Truth be told,
56 See, e.g., Amy Bingham, “Likeable Enough” Hillary Clinton Now More Well-Liked
Than Obama, ABC NEWS, (Mar. 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/like-
able-enough-hillary-clinton-now-more-well-liked-than-obama/.
57 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n).
58 Bank of America, for instance, has $2.1 trillion in assets, which would give the FDIC
access to over $210 billion. See, e.g., Total Assets Rankings, Y-CHARTS, http://ycharts.com/
rankings/assets (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (ranking of bank assets).
59 Note that this may be a procedural way around the supposed restrictions on the Fed
under 13(3). 12 U.S.C. § 343. That is, if the regulators want to use a coerced merger, and
guarantee obligations, they run the troubled institution through OLA for an instant, issue the
guarantee, and then consummate the merger (and close down the OLA)—pointing, proudly, to
the fact that the troubled institution has indeed “disappeared,” thus complying with the stric-
tures of Dodd-Frank.
60 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\2-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 12  1-FEB-13 8:11
446 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 2
however, all of these ad hoc interventions are patches in the absence of
agreements among the major nations (the United States and Great Britain in
particular) about sorting out complex international financial institutions.
Moreover, regulators may prove even more territorial, and more protective
of assets within their jurisdiction in the event of a crisis, than judges are.
II. THE BANKRUPTCY ALTERNATIVE
Even the most fervent advocates of the new resolution approach have
stated that bankruptcy is the presumptive mechanism for resolving the finan-
cial distress of all but the most systemically important financial institu-
tions.61 The question, in a sense, is how big is the set of institutions that
require resolution? Although we identify several important limitations of
bankruptcy in the discussion that follows, we conclude that its benefits as
compared to administrative resolution are considerable, which suggests that
lawmakers should seek to make the set of institutions that require adminis-
trative resolution as small as possible.62
A. The Bankruptcy Process
Although it is quite simple for creditors to file an involuntary bank-
ruptcy, the overwhelming majority of cases are initiated by the debtor’s man-
agers.63 Once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, because its goal is a
collective determination of the highest-and-best use of the firm’s assets and
an allocation of rights according to pre-bankruptcy priorities, the so-called
automatic stay (and related rules) prohibits most creditors from grabbing or
selling collateral, pursuing litigation against the debtor, terminating contracts
based on the fact that the debtor is insolvent or in bankruptcy, or otherwise
attempting to collect pre-bankruptcy obligations.64 Of significant importance
for financial institutions, because of special provisions added after the origi-
nal Bankruptcy Code of 1978, derivatives, repos and other qualifying finan-
cial contracts are not subject to most aspects of this automatic stay.65
61 See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 20, at 77 (indicating that “[b]ankruptcy is and R
will remain the dominant tool for handling the failure of a [bank holding company] . . . .”).
62 We discuss in this part the current bankruptcy process. We believe that bankruptcy can
be made significantly more effective for the largest financial institutions; we take these re-
forms up infra Part V.B.
63 See Bankruptcy, STATE BAR OF MONTANA, http://www.montanabar.org/displaycom-
mon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=24 (last visited Mar. 24, 2012).
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay).
65 The special treatment of derivatives and other financial contracts is explored in detail in
David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in
Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152 (2012). See also Darrell Duffie & David A Skeel, Jr., A
Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agree-
ments 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 108,
2012).
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Derivatives counterparties can therefore terminate their contracts or sell col-
lateral in their possession, unobstructed by bankruptcy’s ordinary stay rules.
In a traditional bankruptcy, the debtor negotiates with its creditors over
the terms of a reorganization plan.66 When the terms of a plan are in place,
the debtor drafts a disclosure statement describing its terms, and the disclo-
sure statement is sent (after court approval) to each creditor or shareholder.67
The plan is thus submitted to a vote, and if the proper majorities of each
class of creditors and shareholders approve the plan, and a number of other
requirements are met, the plan is confirmed by the bankruptcy judge.68 Even
if one or more classes objects, the plan can still be approved through a non-
consensual “cramdown” if, among other things, the plan does not discrimi-
nate unfairly and satisfies the absolute priority rule.69
One obvious difference between financial institution bankruptcies and a
traditional bankruptcy is that a substantial portion of a financial institution’s
assets are often sold very early in the case, because their value to the debtor
will evaporate otherwise.70 Thus, financial institution bankruptcies often in-
volve a prompt sale of time-sensitive assets, followed by a more leisurely
decision making process with the institution’s other assets. Lehman’s broker-
age operations were sold four days after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, for
instance.71
B. Benefits of Bankruptcy
The bankruptcy process has three very important benefits as compared
to an administrative resolution process. The first can be loosely described as
rule of law virtues. Unlike FDIC resolution of banks, the bankruptcy process
is transparent; it is governed by clear priority rules; and it gives creditors a
full judicial opportunity to challenge treatment that does not, in their view,
honor their entitlements.72 It is important to acknowledge that bankruptcy is
not perfect in this regard. The priority rules are largely but not completely
honored. In most jurisdictions, courts permit a debtor to pay its “critical
venders” in full, for instance, even though they technically are general credi-
66 See 5 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 97:31 (3d ed. 2012).
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (disclosure and solicitation).
68 See 1 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 3:14 (3d ed. 2012).
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Dissenting creditors are thus protected by a judicially-deter-
mined liquidation standard, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); dissenting classes are protected by a
judicially-determined payment-in-full standard, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). While not perfect,
the standards are clear and the determinations are made by a neutral decisionmaker.
70 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-707, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES 48 (2011), available at http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-707.
71 Julia Werdigier & Landon Thomas Jr., Barclays Agrees to Buy Some Lehman Assets,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/17/business/worldbusiness/17
barclays.html.
72 See 6 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 113:3 (3d ed. 2012).
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tors.73 Judicial review is sometimes limited by the difficulty of raising and
litigating an issue before it becomes moot. Overall, however, bankruptcy
priorities are much firmer and clearer than creditors’ treatment in an admin-
istrative proceeding. This clarity is likely to enhance credit market efficiency
as compared to murkier priority rules.
The second benefit of bankruptcy is that the prospect that shareholders
and creditors will take losses curbs moral hazard. In 2008, the government
punished the shareholders and managers of firms such as AIG that were
bailed out, ousting the managers and diluting shareholders.74 Creditors, by
contrast, were fully protected.75 Nor is there reason to believe that creditors
will be punished in future bailouts. This approach invites creditor moral haz-
ard. If a financial institution is likely to be resolved in bankruptcy, by con-
trast, creditors cannot assume they will be bailed out and are more likely to
screen and monitor their debtors as a result. Given that solving financial
difficulties will usually be easier when there is “early intervention,” and
given that there is a strong consensus that most interventions—whether
bankruptcy or administrative resolution—occur too late, making it clear that
creditors have “skin in the game” is an important way to bring their knowl-
edge and monitoring abilities to bear.
Third, in bankruptcy, the parties themselves make the principal deci-
sions, rather than a government regulator. Because the parties have more
complete information than even the most vigilant regulator and creditors
have a financial stake in how assets are used and how liabilities are treated,
the financial distress is more likely to be resolved efficiently (at least if the
parties do not have a disincentive to file, an issue we return to in the next
section).
C. The Limitations of Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy also has three major limitations.76 We consider the first two
here. Because the third—the court and its jurisdiction—may be less familiar
and has been less fully explored, we discuss it separately in the next section.
The first criticism of bankruptcy is that it is not well designed to handle
systemic issues. This criticism is often characterized in terms of the limited
73 See Anthony Michael Sabino, The Death of Critical Vendor Motions and Potential De-
mise of the Doctrine of Necessity: Farewell to Two Misbegotten Doctrines, 6 TENN. J. BUS. L.
47, 48 (2004). This may make sense in some situations, particularly where the vendors are, in
fact, irreplaceable and there is a strong argument that the firm has going-concern value. Simi-
larly, honoring warranties on pre-bankruptcy sales may be a necessary component of a con-
sumer-goods manufacturer (or retailer) that warrants continuation rather than liquidation. Even
so, the potential for an “overly enthusiastic” interpretation of these situations remains.
74 See Michael J. de la Merced, A.I.G.’s New Chief Seeks to Reassure Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C4.
75 Brady Dennis, Fed Criticized for Not Negotiating Harder with AIG Creditors, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 2009, at A24.
76 Its ability to handle complex international bankruptcies is perhaps a fourth. Since we
have already discussed this as a potential advantage of Dodd-Frank, we won’t repeat it here.
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focus of the bankruptcy process.77 Bankruptcy is designed to maximize the
value of a particular firm, the argument goes; in contrast to bank regulators,
the principal players do not consider third party effects such as the possibil-
ity that a filing will have systemic consequences.78 The distinction between
bankruptcy and administrative resolution is not as sharp as this argument
often assumes. Bankruptcy judges do not ignore systemic issues.79 But
neither they nor the parties can take control as fully and effectively at the
outset of a case as regulators can under the Dodd-Frank resolution rules. The
difficulty is exacerbated by the absence of a stay on derivatives, which are
often the most systemically sensitive contracts. These limitations will not
prove debilitating in the vast majority of cases—even with Lehman, for in-
stance, no counterparties failed after the company’s default80—but in a few
they might.
Second and related, financing cannot be put in place as quickly in bank-
ruptcy as in administrative resolution. Financing is ordinarily approved
through a two-step process—an interim hearing at the outset of the case, and
a final hearing a week or two thereafter.81 If the debtor needs immediate
liquidity, even a temporary delay at the beginning of a case could be prob-
lematic. The funding limitations should not be overstated. As soon as the
debtor files for bankruptcy, the automatic stay goes into effect with most
obligations, and the debtor does not have to continue making payments.82
Derivatives are a major exception to this.83 But a financial institution could
stop payments on other obligations, such as bonds, which would reduce its
funding needs somewhat. In addition, bankruptcy does not preclude the gov-
77 See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the
Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 98 (1995).
78 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 483 (2011) (dis-
cussing the potential harmful consequences of bankruptcy imposed on systemically important
institutions).
79 Systemic issues can be overstated; correlation is not necessarily causation. See John
Taylor, Defining System Risk Operationally, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW
THEM 33 (Kenneth Scott et al., eds., 2009).
80 See Jean Helwege, Financial Firm Bankruptcy and Systemic Risk, 20 J. INT’L. FIN. MAR-
KETS, INSTS. & MONEY 1, 6 (2010).
81 See Douglas Baird & Martin Bienenstock, Panel 5: Debtor-in-Possession Financing
(Pre-Petition & Lock-Up Agreements), 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 589, 594 (2003). These
can be accelerated, particularly where there has been pre-bankruptcy planning. In the recent
Eastman Kodak bankruptcy, for example, almost a billion dollars of new funding was made
available, with administrative expense priority, within 24 hours of Kodak’s bankruptcy filing.
See Joseph Checkler, Judge Says Kodak Can Tap $950M Bankruptcy Loan From Citi, DAILY
BANKR. REV. (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://bankruptcynews.dowjones.com/article?pid=
10&an=DJFDBR0020120120e81kdb07v&ReturnUrl=http%3a%2f%2fbankruptcynews.dow
jones.com%3a80%2farticle%3fpid%3d10%26an%3dDJFDBR0020120120e81kdb07v.
82 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
83 See id.
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ernment from offering backup funding, as the government did with Leh-
man’s brokerage operations at the outset of its bankruptcy case.84
Nevertheless, systemic issues and the timely availability of funding are
greater concerns in a bankruptcy case than in administrative resolution.
D. The Role and Status of Bankruptcy Judges
The final major limitation of bankruptcy concerns the status of bank-
ruptcy judges. The status of bankruptcy judges poses two problems. One is
inherent in the bankruptcy process; the other is an artifact of the odd, artifi-
cial structure of the U.S. bankruptcy courts.
Casual observers of bankruptcy often assume that the bankruptcy judge
dictates the terms of a reorganization plan and makes the other important
decisions in the case. In reality, the bankruptcy judge functions more like an
umpire than a player in most respects. The parties themselves decide
whether to sell assets or to propose a reorganization, and the judge either
approves or disapproves their handiwork.85 The limited role that the court
plays, and the wide scope the parties are given to determine the resolution of
the case, is part of the genius of bankruptcy. But it also introduces a compli-
cation. Because the judge’s role is reactive, she has only limited information
at the outset of the case. If important decisions need to be made very
quickly, as often is the case in large bankruptcies and will almost always be
the case if the debtor is a large financial institution, the judge is put in a
difficult position. After Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge
was asked to approve the sale of Lehman’s brokerage operations to Barclay’s
almost immediately, based on relatively limited information.86 The judge
does have the benefit of the debtor’s having concluded that the transaction is
in its best interests, but many creditors will not be in a position to weigh in
effectively, so the judge herself may have to exercise discretion based on
much less information that would be ideal.
Bankruptcy judges’ other limitation stems from their odd constitutional
status. Unlike federal trial judges, circuit court judges, and Supreme Court
justices, who are appointed for life under Article III of the Constitution,
bankruptcy judges are Article I judges who serve for fourteen year terms.87
This status is the result of a torturous history that came to head when the
current bankruptcy laws were put in place in 1978.88 Although it would have
made obvious sense to give bankruptcy judges Article III status, Warren
84 See Alman Onaran and Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy After
Suitors Balk, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a6cDDYU5QYyw.
85 See NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. Appendix § 112-A:7 (3d ed. 2012).
86 See Stephen Lubben, The Sale of the Century and Its Impact on Asset Securitization:
Lehman Brothers, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2008–Jan. 2009, at 1.
87 9 AM. JUR. BANKRUPTCY § 825 (2d ed. 2012).
88 See generally DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW IN AMERICA (2001).
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Burger, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and a number of other fed-
eral court judges resisted, apparently feeling that the status of the federal
trial judges would be diluted if the large number of bankruptcy judges were
given equivalent status.89 Under the structure that was put in place in 1984,
after the Supreme Court struck down the 1978 framework, bankruptcy
judges were made adjuncts of the federal trial court.90 Bankruptcy cases
technically go to the district court, but every district automatically refers
them back to these Article I bankruptcy judges.91
Because bankruptcy judges are not appointed for life, some worry that
they are not sufficiently “independent” to handle especially sensitive
cases.92 The independence deficit seems minimal at most. Fourteen years is a
considerable term—long enough to limit any concerns about job security—
and the initial appointment process is less politically charged than with other
federal judges, since the circuit court rather than politicians selects bank-
ruptcy judges. Moreover, even the most politically-charged bankruptcy cases
tend to raise significantly fewer political hackles than the kinds of issues that
district judges routinely face, making the likelihood that reappointment be-
comes a political football unlikely.93 Non-Article III status does, however,
constrain bankruptcy judges on the margin. The limits were brought home
last year when the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy judge could not
handle a dispute involving Anna Nicole Smith.94 This jurisdictional limita-
tion could easily be remedied, as discussed below. The limitations of an ex
post overseer are more indigenous to bankruptcy itself.
III. IS BAIL-IN THE SOLUTION?
Especially in Europe, and increasingly in the U.S., the most popular
resolution strategy among banking experts is not either bankruptcy or Dodd-
Frank-style administrative resolution. The word that makes their eyes light
up is “bail-in.” The best way to earn appreciative nods at a banking confer-
ence is to propose that what we really need is “some kind of bail-in.”
Just what is bail-in? The first step toward understanding bail-in and its
popularity is to recognize that the bail-in concept predates the recent crisis.
The term first came into common usage after the sovereign debt crises of the
89 See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts,
62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 761 (2010).
90 2 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 11:4 (2011).
91 BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 2.1 (5th ed. 2011).
92 See, e.g., McKenzie, supra note 89, at 750–52 (noting and rejecting this concern). R
93 Reappointment battles are uncommon in general, and in the rare instances when they
occur (as with the denial of reappointment to Judge David Scholl in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in the 1990s), the denial has not been for political reasons. In re United States,
463 F.3d 1328, 1329–1330 (2006) (denial of Judge Scholl’s reappointment the result of Third
Circuit decision based on questionnaires regarding his competence submitted by attorneys and
bankruptcy trustees who have appeared before him).
94 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011).
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late 1990s and early 2000s, which culminated with the most recent Argen-
tine default.95 As unhappiness with the IMF’s bailout policies grew, policy
makers began talking about bail-in—by which they meant participation by
private creditors in any rescue effort.96 Less euphemistically, bail-in meant
that private creditors should be expected to take haircuts—perhaps automati-
cally and certainly by pre-existing knowledge of the possibility.
Under this conception of bail-in, it is easy to understand its initial at-
traction. The almost uniform protection of creditors in 2008 financial crisis,
and the creditor moral hazard this created, has been widely criticized. A
genuine bail-in would address this concern. But nothing mentioned thus far
would distinguish bail-in from bankruptcy or even Dodd-Frank resolution—
at least to the extent Dodd-Frank resolution would not bail out all of the
financial institution’s creditors. What, then, do bail-in proponents have in
mind when they contrast it with bankruptcy and the OLA rules?
The answer seems to be that bail-in would preserve the financial institu-
tion as an ongoing entity, rather than liquidating it, and that regulators’ dis-
cretion would be channeled. Under some of the existing proposals, bail-in
would take place outside of the resolution process; under others, the bail-in
would occur as a form of regulatory resolution.97 Lawyers at Clifford Chance
have proposed, for instance, that financial institutions be required to issue
bail-in eligible senior debt.98 If bail-in were triggered, the financial institu-
tion’s stock would be wiped out and the bail-in eligible senior debt would be
restructured.99 Deposits and other obligations would be protected. This, they
argue, would more effectively recapitalize the institution than simply wiping
out stock and converting some low priority debt obligations to stock, as con-
tingent capital-based proposals contemplate.100
It is perhaps worth noting that the FDIC could achieve the essentially
the same effect under Dodd-Frank’s resolution rules. At least in theory, the
FDIC could set up a bridge financial company after invoking the resolution
rules, transfer important assets and any liabilities that FDIC wishes to pro-
tect to the bridge financial company, and issue equity to the creditors that
have been left behind.101 Although this strategy would violate the spirit of
the resolution rules, as discussed earlier, it would recapitalize the institution
in the same way as the leading bail-in proposals advocate.
95 See NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (2005).
96 See id. at 3.
97 See, e.g., Riva Froymovich, EU Insists on Bail-In as Part of Bank Resolution Legisla-
tion, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120330-713022.
html.
98 See CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 14, at 9. R
99 See id.
100 See id. at 6.
101 See generally Randall G. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 29 YALE J. REG. 121 (2012)
(outlining how this might work).
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The chief attraction of bail-ins is the prospect of a prompt reconfigura-
tion of the financial institution’s capital structure. One possible strategy
would be to conduct the bail-in entirely at the holding company level.  This
would minimize disruption of the institution’s operations, since few of the
operations of large American financial institutions are conducted in the hold-
ing company.  So long as the parent holding company had sufficient debt in
its capital structure, as currently is the case and could be mandated by law,
the rest of the enterprise could be left intact. If the bail-in worked as de-
signed, the basic contours of the restructuring would be put in place almost
immediately. The actual distribution of securities to the old creditors might
take longer, but creditors’ entitlements would be determined much more
quickly than in bankruptcy.  The FDIC and at least one Federal Reserve gov-
ernor appear to have embraced this general strategy.  In a recent speech,
Daniel Tarullo offered a succinct overview and endorsement:
In developing the orderly liquidation authority established by Title
II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC has recently expressed a pref-
erence for resolving a failed SIFI under a single receivership and
internal recapitalization model. Under this model, the parent com-
pany of the failed SIFI is placed into receivership; all, or substan-
tially all, of the assets of the parent company are transferred to a
bridge entity; the parent company and its residual assets are liqui-
dated; and the bridge entity is capitalized, in part, by converting
the holders of long-term unsecured debt of the parent company
into equity holders in the bridge. Under the single receivership
model, the major subsidiaries of the SIFI continue to operate as
going concerns. This approach holds great promise, but ensuring
its viability as a resolution option requires, among other things,
that each SIFI maintain an amount of long-term unsecured debt
that is sufficient to absorb very significant losses at the firm.102
Bail-ins have many of the same shortcomings as traditional administra-
tive resolution, however: in particular, most of the recent proposals depend
on regulators to decide when to trigger the bail-in and how much of a haircut
creditors should receive. The principal existing proposals contemplate that
102 International Harmonization of Wall Street Reform: Orderly Liquidation, Derivatives,
and the Volcker Rule: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Aff.,,
112th Cong., 5 (2012) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd.), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20120322a.htm; see also En-
forcement of Subsidiary and Affiliate Contracts by the FDIC as Receiver of a Covered Finan-
cial Company, 77 Fed. Reg. 18128–29 (proposed Mar. 27, 2012) (stating that “orderly
liquidation of a covered financial company may best be accomplished by establishing a single
receivership of the parent holding company and transferring valuable operations and assets to a
solvent bridge financial company, including the stock or other equity interests of the com-
pany’s various subsidiaries. Accordingly, the Dodd-Frank Act provides the FDIC with the tools
and flexibility to act effectively as receiver for the covered financial company at the holding
company or parent level without placing solvent subsidiaries into receivership.”), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2012/2012-03-27_proposed-rule_02.pdf.
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long-term debt will be subject to bail-in, while regulators will protect short-
term obligations.103 The extent of the haircut is left to administrative discre-
tion. In addition, the commitment to bail-out short-term obligations could
magnify the temptation of financial institutions to rely on these forms of
funding, which proved highly fragile in 2008.
There also is something incongruous about the strategy underlying bail-
ins. The bail-in proposals assume that systemically important financial insti-
tutions must be preserved as going concerns. Not only is this assumption
less compelling with financial institutions than with sovereign debtors—the
original subject of bail-in proposals—but the bail-in proposals seem to as-
sume that the institution’s distress can be solved by making simple adjust-
ments to its balance sheet. In reality, liquidity may be a more important
concern for a troubled institution that regulators wish to rescue; a bail-in
may ease a financial institution’s liquidity constraints somewhat, but it
doesn’t solve a liquidity problem.
As an alternative to a bail-in that depends on the exercise of administra-
tive discretion, a bail-in could also include automatic, market-based triggers.
Contingent capital securities that are converted into equity if the issuer’s cap-
ital falls below a specified level are in a sense a limited version of automatic
bail-in.104 This approach, which is the subject of an extensive legal literature
in the corporate bankruptcy context,105 could be used more fully, to provide
for automatic haircuts to other classes of securities. The attraction of this
approach is that it addresses the problem of regulator delay or inaction. Its
limitations are also considerable, however, as is well known.106 The most
obvious triggers—such as capital requirements—could be manipulated by a
troubled financial institution. Automatic triggers may also be subject to ma-
nipulation by the institution’s creditors. The trigger also may be over-inclu-
sive or under-inclusive, particularly where the issue is liquidity rather than
capital.107 As the turmoil in Greece has made clear, regulators may also be
reluctant to allow the markets to function in a crisis.108 Just as regulators
103 See, e.g., CLIFFORD CHANCE, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that “if the bank is to be R
preserved as a going concern its ‘trade creditors’—payment services customers, short term
creditors, securities and trading exposures, etc.—must be preserved intact, and for the pur-
poses of illustration it can be assumed that the bail-in process will be applied to the long-term
investment creditors of the bank—loosely, bondholders and holders of subordinated debt.”).
104 John Coffee has recently written a similar proposal. John C. Coffee, Systemic Risk
After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Over-
sight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011).
105 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Un-
tenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992).
106 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bank-
ruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 465, 477–94 (1993).
107 See CEYLA PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., IMF STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE, CONTINGENT CAPI-
TAL: ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND DESIGN FEATURES 7, 16 (2011), available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf.
108 See Louise Story & Stephen Castle, Four European Nations to Curtail Short-Selling,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at B1 (late edition); Julien Toyer, EU Reaches Deal on Law to Ban
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repeatedly insisted that Greece’s obligations must be restructured without
technically defaulting, so that the credit default swaps on Greek bonds were
not triggered, there is a real risk they would defuse an automatic bail-in.109
IV. REGULATOR-BROKERED SALES
During the height of the financial crisis in 2008, a different strategy was
used to resolve the financial distress of several of the large financial institu-
tions that threatened to collapse. Federal regulators brokered the sales of
Bear Stearns to JP Morgan Chase, Washington Mutual to JP Morgan Chase,
and Wachovia to Wells Fargo.110 Although the new resolution rules might
seem to replace regulator-brokered sales as a resolution strategy, this is un-
likely to be the case. The resolution rules may even increase the salience of
the forced sale option.
Of the three transactions just mentioned, the Bear Stearns sale looked
most like a traditional bailout, and thus like a scenario the Dodd-Frank Act is
designed to supersede. As a now-voluminous literature recounts, federal reg-
ulators agreed to guarantee $29 billion in problematic assets as a condition
of JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear Stearns.111 JP Morgan purchased the bank-
ing assets of Washington Mutual as part of a purchase and assumption trans-
action brokered by the FDIC under the bankruptcy resolution rules; and
Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia after Wachovia had received funding
(known as Open Bank Assistance) from the FDIC.112
The first issue, already alluded to, is the continued relevance of coerced
sales after the enactment of new formal resolution rules. Because each com-
pany in question was a substantial holding company, each would have been
subject to Dodd-Frank resolution if regulators concluded that it met the re-
quirements for invocation of the resolution rules.113 Theoretically, new re-
strictions on the Federal Reserve’s authority to make extraordinary loans
Naked Sovereign CDS, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/10/18/eu-shortselling-idUSL5E7LI3L920111018.
109 See Peter Eavis, Greek Crisis Raises New Fears Over Credit-Default Swaps,
DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2012, 9:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/greek-crisis-
raises-new-fears-over-credit-default-swaps/.
110 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 290, 365, 370
(2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
111 See, e.g., id. at 290.
112 See PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT AMONG FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, RECEIVER OF WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, AND JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
(Sept. 25, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and_
A.pdf; The Acquisition of Wachovia Corporation by Wells Fargo & Company: Hearing Before
the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n (Sept. 1, 2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Coun-
sel, Fed. Reserve Bank), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/al-
varez20100901a.htm.
113 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1450–1454 (2010). (process by which institution is determined to
be systemically risky, which is necessary for it to be subject to orderly liquidation authority).
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would prevent it from providing a $29 billion backstop in the future.114 But
the new regulatory framework would not necessarily preclude either the
Washington Mutual or Wachovia transactions. Moreover, the Fed might be
able to circumvent the new restriction on emergency loans if it made the
loan available as part of a “broad-based eligibility” program, rather than
targeting only the intended recipient of the loan.115
Indeed, if Dodd-Frank resolution has made direct bailouts—such as the
bailout of AIG—less likely, regulators may have even stronger incentives to
try to arrange a sale outside of formal resolution proceedings. Although the
resolution rules give regulators enormous power, they also leave the regula-
tors responsible for the outcome of the takeover. If the regulators arrange a
sale outside of resolution, they can largely remove the risk that the interven-
tion will blow up in their face. Coerced sales will therefore continue to be an
important resolution option.
Coerced sales raise two concerns of particular note. First, they invaria-
bly make a large institution even larger. If one is concerned about systemic
consequences from the distress of large financial institutions, a coerced sale
could make the potential for systemic consequences worse by postponing
without actually solving the problem. Second, these sales invite interference
with rule of law. The merger of Bear Stearns into JP Morgan Chase included
provisions that violated corporate law,116 and the sale of Wachovia to Wells
Fargo was made possible by a change to its potential tax treatment.117 While
rules can tamp down on these violations, it is not completely clear that they
can be eliminated.118
V. IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL REFORMS
In the wake of Dodd-Frank’s enactment, we are no longer writing on a
blank slate in the United States. Dodd-Frank and its resolution rules are un-
likely to be repealed. For the foreseeable future, the two basic options will
be, as they now are, bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank resolution.
The analysis of this Article suggests that the principal focus of reform
should be maximizing the effectiveness and likelihood of use of the bank-
ruptcy process as an alternative to Dodd-Frank resolution, and amending a
few of the most problematic provisions in Dodd-Frank. We begin by describ-
114 See id. § 1101(a) (amending § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize only
broad-based eligibility programs).
115 See id.
116 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making
Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 744
(2009) (describing the transaction as “pretty clearly invalid under current Delaware law.”).
117 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 110, at 370. R
118 Posner and Vermuele heavily emphasize this theme. See Eric Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of
2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV 1613, 1613–14 (2009).
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ing a handful of simple adjustments, then turn to a slightly more elaborate
proposal to enact a new bankruptcy chapter for large financial institutions.
A. Next Steps for Dodd-Frank and Bankruptcy Reform
In our view, four simple reforms would make the current resolution
options appreciably more effective. The first is simply to remove the “thou
shalt liquidate”—and related—provision from Dodd-Frank’s resolution
rules. As critics of the ad hoc bailouts of 2008, we are sympathetic to the
impulse that led to the provision. But foreclosing the prospect of reorganiza-
tion is at odds with over a century of American insolvency law, and few
believe that regulators will actually honor the liquidation mandate if the res-
olution rules are ever invoked. Moreover, the related insistence that manage-
ment be terminated likely removes the individuals with the best firm-specific
knowledge to make decisions in the rapid time-frame any resolution pro-
ceeding must work in, at least in part.
The second and third proposals would establish presumptions that could
be implemented by bank regulators, without a need for legislative reform. As
it currently stands, nothing in Dodd-Frank requires that either regulators or
the financial institution that prepares a “living will” actually follow the
blueprint of the living will. If regulators committed to honor its terms—in
particular, by not invoking Dodd-Frank’s resolution rules if the living will
contemplates use of bankruptcy in the event of financial distress—the plans
would prove more useful and more firms might use bankruptcy rather than
Dodd-Frank resolution. Relatedly, Dodd-Frank gives regulators the power to
override a bankruptcy filing, and put a firm that has filed for bankruptcy in
resolution.119 This power will create a great deal of uncertainty at the outset
of a bankruptcy case. Establishing a strong presumption that regulators will
not pluck financial institutions out of bankruptcy would reduce some of the
uncertainty.
The last and most important reform would remove the special treatment
derivatives and other qualified financial contracts currently receive in bank-
ruptcy. As we have argued in detail elsewhere, subjecting these contracts to
a short stay would appreciably enhance the effectiveness of bankruptcy as a
resolution mechanism for financial institutions.120 If derivatives were subject
to a stay, the managers of AIG might have considered bankruptcy as a plau-
sible option, since it would have enabled them to stop the collateral grabs
that began when AIG was downgraded.
119 See Dodd-Frank Act § 208.
120 See, e.g., Skeel & Jackson, supra note 65; Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19, at 2- R
22–27.
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B. A More Ambitious Program: Chapter 14
A working group at the Hoover Institution (of which we are both par-
ticipants) has devised a set of proposals for large financial institutions (de-
fined as those with more than $100 billion in assets)—called Chapter 14—
that would go still further in making bankruptcy an effective resolution
mechanism for nearly any large financial institution.121 Chapter 14 would
address several of the limitations of bankruptcy discussed earlier. Of particu-
lar note are its proposals for regulator participation, funding in bankruptcy,
and the use of Article III judges. The Chapter 14 proposal would marry some
of the benefits of administrative resolution with those of bankruptcy.122
Start with the role of regulators. In an ordinary Chapter 11 case, the
regulators’ ability to participate is quite constrained. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, they cannot initiate the bankruptcy case.123 The Chapter 14 proposal
would explicitly authorize regulators to file an involuntary bankruptcy case
against an insolvent financial institution that was of sufficient financial
size;124 and it would give regulators standing to appear and be heard on any
issue in the case.125 Although regulators have traditionally been slow to take
action, this proposal would enable them to file a case if managers failed to
do so, and it provides a mechanism for tapping the information regulators
have as a result of their ongoing supervisory role.126 In addition, it ensures
that there will be a voice for systemic consequences in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
The second innovation involves funding. Bankruptcy already facilitates
financing through its debtor-in-possession financing provision, which gives
the court wide latitude to approve new loans.127 Under the Chapter 14 propo-
sal, the debtor would be explicitly authorized to use some of this financing
to make immediate, partial payments to creditors (such as derivatives
counterparties) with time sensitive claims.128 If the initial payment gives
these creditors more than other general creditors eventually receive, the dif-
ference could be clawed back.129 But any clawback would occur much later,
121 See Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19. R
122 The proposal is similar to proposals by Robert Bliss and George Kaufman in this re-
gard. See Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Resolving Insolvent Large Complex Finan-
cial Institutions: A Better Way, 128 BANKING L.J. 339 (2011).
123 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (only debtors and creditors may initiate a Chapter 11 case).
124 The Chapter 14 proposal is limited to financial institutions with at least $100 billion in
assets. Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19, at 1-3. R
125 Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19, at 2-9, 2-11. R
126 See id.
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 364
128 Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19, at 2-15. R
129 Id. at 2-34–35.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\2-2\HLB202.txt unknown Seq: 25  1-FEB-13 8:11
2012] Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions 459
after the initial crisis had passed. This should appreciably reduce the risk that
the filing would have problematic systemic effects.130
One question not fully addressed in the current Chapter 14 proposal is
the potential gap between the moment of the filing and the time at which
debtor-in-possession financing is put in place. In ordinary Chapter 11 cases,
courts approve financing quite quickly, often within a day or two. If the
debtor is a financial institution, even a brief delay may be problematic, given
the speed at which liquidity can disappear. As noted earlier, the automatic
stay relieves a debtor’s liquidity needs somewhat, by halting the obligation to
make payments on pre-bankruptcy obligations. In addition, the debtor can
minimize the gap by arranging its financing prior to filing for bankruptcy.
But even a small gap may be problematic. This suggests that it may make
sense to give financial institutions that were amenable to Chapter 14 access
to a government funding facility on terms analogous to those provided in
Dodd-Frank’s administrative resolution process that would not require court
approval.131  In practice, this approach might function somewhat similarly to
the “blended approach” advocated by several recent commenters. The
blended approach proposes the administrative resolution be used for system-
ically important functions like the payment system, while the remainder
would be resolved in bankruptcy.132  Under Chapter 14, bankruptcy would be
used in both contexts, but immediate funding could be used to protect essen-
tial functions.
A third innovation of Chapter 14 is its proposed judicial framework.
Under Chapter 14, the case would be overseen by a federal district court
judge selected by the Chief Justice of the United States from a panel of
judges with financial expertise.133 This would address any concerns about
independence or jurisdictional scope. Chapter 14 also would explicitly au-
thorize the judge to make use of special masters if he wished to bring addi-
tional expertise into the case.
If fully implemented, Chapter 14 would make a number of other adjust-
ments as well. It would reshape the existing bankruptcy rules to handle the
distinctive challenges posed by the financial distress of one or more of the
largest financial institutions.
130 This proposal is similar to proposals by George Kaufman. See George G. Kaufman, A
Proposal for Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions at Large Insolvent Banks,
9 J. BANKING REG. 3 (2007).
131 To that extent, the regulator, not the bankruptcy judge, would be the gatekeeper of the
first-stage of post-petition funding.
132 See, e.g., Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 122, at 357; Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV et al., The R
History and Rationale for a Separate Bank Resolution Process, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVE-
LAND ECON. COMMENT., Feb. 2, 2012, at 3.
133 Chapter 14 Proposal, supra note 19, at 2-7. R
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have compared the two principal mechanisms for
resolving the distress of a large financial institution, administrative resolu-
tion and bankruptcy, in the particular context of the new Dodd-Frank resolu-
tion rules and U.S. bankruptcy laws. We also have considered recent
proposals for “bail-in” of large financial institutions, which turn out to be
more similar to Dodd-Frank than might initially seem to be the case. The
principal sticking point with each is the dependence on administrative dis-
cretion. In the United States, at least, the objective should be to make bank-
ruptcy as effective as possible and to minimize the need—and opportunity—
for regulators to invoke Dodd-Frank resolution. We have suggested a hand-
ful of changes to the Dodd-Frank Act and to the bankruptcy laws that might
help further this objective.
